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Abstract 
The article problematizes the role of real estate in geopolitical circulations. The 
internationalization of real estate increases mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities 
between nation states and therefore calls for a better appreciation of the geopolitical 
externalities and exteriorities of real estate. The article brings together disjoint bodies of 
literature on real estate globalization, assemblage theory, and international relations to 
show how real estate is a case of the geopolitics of the multiple – geopolitics that is being 
assembled by diverse and distributed actors, discourses, and materialities representing the 
contingent and emergent formation of connections and considerations, which affect the 
ways how foreign relations are negotiated today. The argument is substantiated by 
considering several dimensions of the real estate/geopolitics nexus: (i) external influences 
over domestic real estate markets; (ii) the implications of outward real estate investment; 
(iii) state-led mega-projects conveying externally the power of the state. These dimensions 
are considered empirically in the context of the renewed geopolitical tensions between a 
resurgent Russia and the West. Overall, the article calls for a better positioning of real 
estate in the conceptualizations of soft power, state power, and geopolitics. 
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Introduction  
 
Real estate is increasingly internationalized. Ever more property actors penetrate markets 
beyond their area of origin, drawing on multiple networks and sources of knowledge, 
finance and materials. A growing body of research investigates aspects of this process, 
ranging from cross-border property investment, the transfer of knowledge to the 
transformation of real estate into liquid financial assets. Yet, this literature hardly explores 
how the internationalization of real estate affects geopolitics, that is, ‘struggles over 
territories for the purpose of political control over space’ (Lacoste, 1993, p. 696). And yet, 
as newspapers write on an almost daily basis about the ‘invasion’ of global cities by foreign 
property investors, there is a growing awareness that the geopolitical relations of property 
internationalization warrant academic investigation (Rogers, Lee, & Yan, 2015). 
  
Setting out from this (lack of) recognition, the present article seeks to explore some of the 
venues that may expose the ‘geopolitics of real estate’ (Büdenbender & Golubchikov, 
2016; Golubchikov, 2013): that is, how the internationalization of real estate interplays 
with, and redefines, contemporary geopolitics and how the latter is made more complex as 
a result, involving actors and discourses that can sit inside but also outside formal state 
institutions. Indeed, owing to its multi-scalar and distributed nature, the realm of real estate 
fits well both into those conceptualizations of state authority that see the latter as de-
territorialised and diffused (Agnew, 2005) and into the new conceptions of geopolitics, 
which, as Moisio and Paasi (2013, p. 257, drawing on Reuber, 2009) suggest, ‘refers to a 
complex assemblage of phenomena and agency, such as geopolitical discourses as 
representation of space and power, or the geo-policymaking of political actors, scientists, 
consultant, and the media…’. What this also alludes to is an increasing messiness in the 
construction of international relations in the era of globalization, giving rise to what we 
call here the ‘geopolitics of the multiple’.  
In the following, we discuss the extant literature and its inattention to the geopolitical 
intricacies of real estate. We explain this with a lack of dialogue between bodies of relevant 
literatures. On the one hand, work on real estate internationalization focuses on private 
actors, which are not commonly associated with international relations or geopolitics. On 
the other hand, the state-centrism of traditional International Relations (IR) has weakened 
this discipline’s ability to account for non-state actors and their multi-scalar and 
interpenetrating relations. We take inspirations from political geography, the idea of ‘soft 
power’ and assemblage thinking to account for the complex actors and channels making 
up states’ interrelationships in the global political economy. We argue that real estate is a 
case of ‘the geopolitics of the multiple’ - that is, increased international influences and 
dependencies that emerge not simply through the conscious actions of institutionalized 
authority but also circuitously, via the wider assemblages of actors, practices, discourses, 
and materialities. 
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We explore our propositions empirically through the instance of Russia. The case is 
interesting given the renewed geopolitical tensions between a resurgent Russian state and 
the West. The internationalization of real estate, driven both by foreign actors in Russia 
and by Russian interests abroad, has created interdependencies, which contribute 
complexity to the ways international relations between Russia and Europe are negotiated 
today. We firstly overview the internationalization of property within Russia, and show 
how this process is shaped by competition between institutions and organizations 
representing different nationally specific interests. We explore the ways in which these 
dynamics have defined and affected geopolitical considerations. Secondly, we turn our 
attention to the opposite directions of internationalization, that is, Russian real estate 
activities abroad; here, we focus on both property investments in the so-called safe tax 
havens and Russians’ property acquisitions in Southern Europe as examples of non-state-
driven geopolitical assemblages. Thirdly, we consider the overseas expansion of the 
Russian Church via property acquisition and the realization of mega real estate projects 
within Russia (Sochi Olympics) as domains that are more commonly associated with 
Russian soft power and international influence. These varied cases will help us illustrate 
how real estate is charged with geopolitical symbolism and soft power corollaries.  
 
Seeking the geopolitical in real estate globalization 
 
Following Clark and Lund (2000, p. 468) the globalization of real estate implies a growing 
number of actors “at increasing distances from the market area, involved in the production, 
ownership, maintenance, use and reproduction of the built environment.” This process is 
not only driven by the international expansion of property investors and consultants but 
also by the increasing integration of all types of real estate, from housing to infrastructure, 
into global financial flows (Aalbers, 2016; Weber, 2010). Indeed, financial de- and re- 
regulation, innovation and the rise of institutional investors have facilitated the 
transformation of spatially fixed and idiosyncratic properties into ‘just another asset’ that 
can be traded like any other financial product (Loon and Aalbers, 2016). 
 
While real estate internationalization is driven by economic interests, the scale and scope 
of this process creates vulnerabilities and leverage that those girded with state power and 
other actors may consider when negotiating their states’ position in the international 
political economy. Yet, the literature exploring the internationalization of real estate does 
little in the way of addressing the potential geopolitical implications of this process. If 
considered at all, geopolitics is used descriptively, as a context in which business is 
conducted (e.g. Maier, Kaufman, & Baroian, 2014), not as a process that may well involve 
real estate itself as one of its ingredients and that needs to be problematized as such. In 
other words, there are no explicit attempts to consider the co-production of real estate and 
geopolitics – i.e. seeing geopolitics not merely conditioning, but also conditioned by, real 
estate production and circulation.  
 
One reason for this inattention to the role of real estate in the production of geopolitics lies 
with this literature’s predominant focus on private actors, such as households (Cook, Smith, 
& Searle, 2013; Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2014), real estate businesses (De 
Magalhães, 2001) and foreign investors (Rogers et al., 2015) – as opposed to nation states 
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and international relations. This is further complicated by two other factors. First, the use 
of geopolitics in this literature is somewhat bounded by state-centrism of international 
relations (IR) that has traditionally shaped geopolitical imaginaries even well beyond its 
own discipline (Flint and Taylor, 2011). In traditional IR studies, state sovereignty is 
considered contingent on territorially bounded state spaces; domestic and foreign affairs 
are seen as separate; state power is performed by formal state structures. It is not surprising 
then that the networks of private real estate actors are not considered as agents of IR and 
of geopolitical relevance, while state power is seen tangentially, as external to real estate 
circulations. Second, even when rejecting the crude idea of state capture, the literature on 
real estate internationalization nevertheless tends to emphasise a weak state vis-à-vis 
international real estate interests and to see regulatory changes as the outcome of the 
seductive powers of private markets (e.g. Aalbers, Engelen, & Glasmacher, 2011). The 
interplay of state power and real estate internationalization is consequently seen as 
producing ‘downward’ effects for state power, while the potential for the ‘upward’ effects, 
such as consolidating, circulating and discharging state power via real estate processes, 
remains beyond the explanatory nets of this literature. 
 
Recent advances in political geography and IR studies, however, challenge state-centrism 
and the view of the state as necessarily weak; they offer conceptual tools to better account 
for the multiple actors and spaces of modern statecraft, which can also enrich the real estate 
internationalization literature. For example, state-space theory, exploring the relationships 
between economic globalization and the spatial organization of the state, rejects the notion 
of the nation state being hollowed-out; it instead highlights a shift in state spatial priorities 
from the all-national territorial development to selected subnational locations as strategic 
sites and scales for state regulation and accumulation (Brenner 2003, 2009). In conjunction 
with an increasing openness of national economies and a greater regulatory power of 
supranational agencies, this process is conceptualized as ‘glocalization’ (Brenner, 2004; 
Swyngedouw, 2004). It also considers ‘glocalized’ real estate projects and processes as a 
way of making states externally competitive – although the focus here is on geo-economic, 
not geopolitical competitiveness, as well as on a purposeful agenda-setting by state agents 
(Cowen and Smith, 2009; also Moisio & Paasi, 2013). However, despite its advances, the 
literature preserves a hierarchical, scalar language and imagery, which makes it difficult to 
capture non-hierarchical (and oft-unintended) embodiments and entanglements of state 
power (Allen and Cocharane, 2010).  
 
What is more, Agnew (1994; 2004), argued that conventional IR theory has led to a 
‘territorial trap’ and that territorially bounded ‘container’ perspective of the state is 
insufficient to account for the diverse spheres, actors, and materialities that make up the 
infrastructure of state power and geopolitics. Nye’s (1990; 2004) concept of ‘soft power’ 
may address these criticisms, at least to some extent, as it opens up conceptual space to 
account for alternative, benevolent and non-coercive means of state power, such as cultural 
diplomacy, economic links, and co-option. Nye’s writings have been particularly directed 
at analysing the role of soft power in promoting US interests in the contemporary world. 
As such, the origin and the use of this concept is inherently geopolitical. Indeed, it has been 
quickly adopted in writings on geopolitics, informing, inter alia, the distinction between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ geopolitics (Gritsch, 2005). While the boundary between soft and hard 
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power – and between soft and hard geopolitics for that matter – is open to interpretation, 
the key value of the idea lies particularly in its recognition that non-state actors can be (and 
are) part of the production of geopolitical landscapes.  
The above-discussed works can elucidate our understanding of the different scales, 
domains, and agents of state power under globalization. What is still missing, however, for 
the purpose of our analysis is a unifying framework that would capture how exactly multi-
scalar and distributed places, actors and relations can come together to perform ‘the 
geopolitics of the multiple’, and the role of real estate within it. Thinking geopolitics 
through assemblage theory is an apposite strategy to address this gap.  
 
Assemblage theory, while admittedly representing diverse and not always consistent arrays 
of ideas, draws on philosophical traditions that emphasize the heterogeneity and 
relationality of things, people and the broader world of substance, material being and 
experience (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988). This provides the foundation for analyses of the 
co-combination and mutual constitution of what is often ontologically divided: material 
things and bodies, social representations, and subjective experiences (Robbins & Marks, 
2009, p. 197). DeLanda (2006) proposes assemblage as a theory of ‘relations of 
exteriority’; in other words, a whole (e.g. a state or company) is made up of component 
parts, material and immaterial, which are themselves not reducible to their function within 
it, nor to a single logic, but can simultaneously be part of other wholes or reassembled into 
other relationships (Dittmer, 2014; Ong and Collier, 2005). A particular focus here lies on 
emergence, contingence, performance and events rather than on formations and 
permanencies (McFarlane, 2009). From this perspective, the state appears not as a 
territorially closed and internally coherent unit, but rather as fickle performative 
assemblage of heterogeneous and continuously transforming components.   
 
A number of scholars have applied elements of assemblage thinking to the realm of state 
territory and power. Sassen (2008), for example, conceptualizes modern state power in 
terms of assemblages of distributed authority, which are constituted and continuously 
renegotiated by state hierarchies, private actors, partnerships and supranational institutions. 
Following Allen & Cochrane (2010, p. 1078), such assemblages ‘perform a key role in 
effectively unbundling what were formerly seen as exclusive territories such as the nation 
state, but in ways that produce partial formations of private and public authority operating 
according to their own rhythms and spatial practices’. In addition to accounting for the role 
of different actors and materialities in making up assemblages of state authority, the 
perspective repudiates the oppositions between territorial and relational, macro and micro, 
domestic and foreign. It also emphasizes the contingence of state power on the dynamics 
of its constituent elements.  
 
Turning to geopolitics more directly, Dittmer (2014, p. 386) argues that ‘assemblage 
embeds a relational ontology that dissolves the macro/micro scalar tensions at the heart of 
geopolitics.’ Indeed, geopolitics emerges here as a domain of the multiple – as emergent 
and diffused, performed by a multiplicity of agencies that produce dynamic narratives, 
subjectivities, actions, and routines that interplay with the more formal spheres of 
international relations. From this perspective, geopolitics may well also appear within and 
through the worlds of real estate.  
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Of course, there are still copious debates with respect to assemblage theory per se, 
including critiques of its ability to conceptualize the forces that hold assemblages together, 
account for underpinning motives of actors, as well as for the more persistent and 
hegemonic tendencies and causalities (Fuller, 2013). However, our take on assemblages is 
more tactical than ontological. Assemblage thinking equips us with a more integrative and 
interpretive apparatus that mediates between the perspectives offered by the works on real 
estate internationalization, state spaces and soft power, thus, facilitating proper initial 
accounts of conceptualising the geopolitics of real estate as the geopolitics of the multiple.   
 
In order to specify and substantiate this perspective, we will now turn to different 
dimensions of the real estate/geopolitics nexus. We structure our discussions with attention 
to the following themes: (i) external influences and objectives shaping Russia’s domestic 
real estate markets; (ii) the geopolitical implications of Russia’s property investments 
abroad; (iii) mega-projects that externally convey the power of the state. 
 
The internationalization of real estate from the outside in  
Real estate as a marketable and profit-making good emerged during Russia’s transition 
from state socialism to capitalism. During late socialism most properties, including land, 
buildings, factories, infrastructure, were state owned or collectivised. In 1990 before 
privatization began, 67% of the national housing stock was state-owned. In urban areas, 
state ownership was even higher with 79% of the housing stock in state hands. In rural 
areas housing tenure was more balanced with only 37% state- and 54% private home 
ownership (Kosareva, 1993, p. 202). 1  In the 1990s, large-scale privatisation and 
liberalisation programmes transferred a sizeable portion of real estate to private hands, 
opening opportunities not only for local but also for international advisors and investors.  
Indeed, national and multinational bodies ‘emerged en masse at the end of the Cold War, 
at the end of history, marching out of American and Europe to teach the rest of the world 
to be like them’ (Pomerantsev, 2014, p. 36). Sweden, for instance, played a key role in the 
development of Russia’s land registration and cadastral system (Volovich & Nikitina, 
2012), while German experts and state institutions provided expertise in the field of spatial 
planning (Wende et al., 2014). While they were all ‘missionaries of democratic capitalism’ 
(Pomerantsev, 2014, p. 36), ideological differences concerning the specific financial, legal 
and institutional systems they promoted remained. The development trajectory Russia or 
other transition countries would take mattered internationally as it was thought to 
determine which countries would be able to extend political influence and benefit most 
from the newly created markets.  
The choice of the national housing finance model is a case in point. The adoption of a 
housing finance system in Russia was shaped by the competition between institutions 
                                                        
1
 The higher share of privately owned housing in rural areas can be explained with the urban bias of 
socialist policies, which often left rural-dwellers to their own devices including the provision of housing 
(Harloe, 1996 for an overview of Soviet housing policies see: Sillince, 2014) 
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representing different national models (Stephens, Lux, & Sunega, 2015). For example, 
even though German Bausparkassen2 offered advantages in the Russian context (which 
was characterized by the undeveloped banking system, few institutional investors, and the 
absence of personal credit histories) they were not able to dominate the expert discourse 
(Khmelnitskaya, 2014, pp. 161–162). US-based actors spearheaded by the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), who lobbied for mortgage-backed 
securitization 3 (Zavisca, 2012, pp. 49–69), decried the Bauspar system for not being 
‘modern’ and side tracking savings ‘out of the normal financial system’ (Diamond, 2002, 
p. 4). They succeeded, and between 1993 and 1998, the legal foundations for a secondary 
mortgage market were put in place and the Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending 
(AHML), modeled after US Fannie Mae, was established. 
America’s ability to promote financial globalization to enhance its own ‘soft power’ has 
been widely researched (Panitch & Konings, 2008; Seabrooke, 2001). Focussing on the 
globalization of real estate, Gotham (2006) showed that the US actively steers this process 
by promoting the adoption of financial tools, standardized legislation and best practices. 
Yet, it is evident that the US was only partially successful in incorporating Russia into a 
US-dominated system. In the early years of transition, the development of the primary 
mortgage market – not to speak of securitization – was inhibited by a dysfunctional banking 
system, high inflation and interest rates (World Bank, 2003). In the 2000s, when Russia 
experienced economic growth, mortgages began to take off; yet, lending was primarily 
financed by state-owned banks and government subsidies. Even though securitization grew 
rapidly in particularly 2006-2007, its share of overall mortgages remained around 5% (IFR 
Russia, 2008).45 Regardless of these limitations, the US has succeeded in extending its 
ideological hegemony. Despite the blatant anti-Americanism in Russia’s present-day 
politics, Russian policy makers do not question the superiority of long-term debt over 
saving models in housing finance. The US-backed institutions have firmly determined all 
key parameters in which housing-related policy reforms are pursued. Furthermore, the 
institutional and legal infrastructures are in place to kick-start full-fledged securitization at 
a right time, in this respect making the extension of US financial power an imminent 
possibility in the future. 
It is not only via the institutions and mechanism of housing finance that the geopolitics of 
real estate has been demonstrated. The permeation of property by foreign capital and 
                                                        
2
 The system of Bausparkassen is a comprehensive instrument for financing homeownership. It is based on 
a loan-savings collective that is independent from the capital market. Housing loans are financed by the 
savings of ongoing members and redemption payments of those who have already been given a loan.  
3
 In the process of securitization lenders move mortgage loans off-balance and sell them as financial asset 
to investors. The role of securitizers is taken by so-called special purpose vehicles. They are the market 
makers who buy mortgage portfolios from lenders (‘originators’), package them and resell them as MBS to 
investors (Aalbers, 2008, p. 152).  
4
 To put this into perspective, mortgage securitization in the U.S. amounted to more than 50% of the 
mortgage market in 2009 (Federal Reserve, 2009). 
5
 It is important to note that the failure of the US model of securitization did not leave a complete vacuum 
in the provision of housing finance. On the contrary, since the early 2000s the Russian state has actively 
promoted mortgage financing by offering subsidized housing loans to different sectors of society, e.g. 
families (through maternity capital) and state employees (subsidized mortgages for teachers and housing 
vouchers for military families) (Khmelnitskaya, 2015; Zavisca, 2012). 
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expertise as well as the acquisition of land and real estate abroad are key sites through 
which (multi-scalar) international relations unfold. Already in Soviet times, a few foreign 
real estate companies operated in the Soviet territory as part of specific bilateral trade 
agreements. Turkish Enka and Finish YIT, for instance, were involved in infrastructure 
projects and participated in the reconstruction of historic buildings (Enka, 2016; YIT, 
2012). When the Soviet Union collapsed, these companies continued to operate in Russia. 
Yet, it was not until the early 2000s when Vladimir Putin was elected President that the 
internationalization of property gained a wider momentum. Upon his arrival in power, 
Putin reformed political institutions and the tax system, putting an end to the previous 
decade of institutional chaos. Coupled with rising oil-prices these reforms initiated a period 
of economic growth, which translated into rising salaries and growing consumer appetite, 
giving rise to a boom in office and retail construction (Rutland, 2008).  
 
This expansion in development activities was heavily financed by foreign capital. Indeed, 
in the context of notoriously high inflation in Russia and a liquidity glut globally, foreign 
capital readily replaced domestic sources of funding (Arakelyan & Nestmann, 2011). Not 
only were all real estate banks operating in Russia foreign owned, but Russian banks 
themselves increasingly financed their lending activities on international capital markets 
(Egorov & Kovalenko, 2013). What is more, foreign investors began to enter the Russian 
market directly. According to the estimations of leading real estate consultancies, the share 
of foreign investors in commercial real estate transactions reached over 60% between 2004 
and 2008 (Cushman and Wakefield, 2016, p. 14; JLL, 2014, p. 4). While this number 
should be treated with caution, as it is likely to over-represent more transparent transactions 
involving foreign capital as well as to reflect an offshore structure of Russian business, it 
is unquestionable that the share of foreign capital and investors engaging commercial real 
estate transactions in Russia increased dramatically.  
 
The presence of foreign property actors, dependence on external capital and offshores not 
only made Russia vulnerable to global economic shocks but also opened up a new stage 
for its geopolitical relations. Foreign businesses, especially those owning extensive real 
estate in Russia, are naturally interested in its political and economic stability. This has 
become visible in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the ensuing sanctions 
that were levied by the West against Russia in 2014. Calls by German companies (such as 
retailer Metro) to end the sanctions were so loud and persistent that the German lobbying 
association BDI felt pressured to send a disciplining letter to more than 1000 of its members 
(Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten, 2015). Even diplomats acknowledged that business 
interests put the German government under pressure to avoid potentially tougher sanctions 
on Russia (Karnitschnig, 2014; The Economist, 2014a). While property-related companies 
are not the only ones to lobby against sanctions, they have good reasons to be particularly 
concerned. As real estate is fixed and capital intensive, making market-exit difficult and 
expensive, property-holding companies are particularly vulnerable to any lasting 
disruptions of international relations. 
 
As we have shown above, the internationalization of real estate through the entrance of 
foreign knowledge, actors and capital creates complex assemblages of distributed 
authority. Internationalization can be part of a soft geopolitics agenda, as in the case of US 
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financial power. Alternatively, as in the case of foreign real estate interests in Russia, 
internationalization generates new interdependencies. Furthermore, the geopolitics of real 
estate is not only shaped by engagement with external influences, but can equally be 
assembled by outward-oriented activities. In the next section, we will examine how the 
‘export’ of Russia’s private and public capital creates an infrastructure through which 
geopolitical relations are further negotiated.  
 
 
 
Going global: the geopolitics of outward real estate investment  
 
The uneven and at times contradictory assemblages of state power through real estate 
internationalization becomes apparent in the outflow of Russian capital into properties 
abroad. Russia is a major outward investing country, with its only officially registered stock 
of cumulative outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) having risen from US$2 billion 
in 1993 to $479 billion by 2014, although then shrinking to $336 billion by 2016 (CBR, 
2016). This makes Russia second largest foreign direct investor among emerging 
economies (Panibratov 2010).6 
 
Real estate makes up a major part of this, exceeding 20% of all OFDI according to some 
estimates (Kuznetsov, 2011, p. 7). Whilst the international expansion of Russian companies 
constitutes part of foreign real estate investments (Panibratov, 2010), property purchases 
by Russian households also plays a role. In 2014/5 there were 114 Russian dollar 
billionaires (Wealth-X & Sotheby’s, 2015) and 242,000 millionaire households (BCG, 
2015) for whom a terraced house in Chelsea or a penthouse in Manhattan was the most 
direct entry ticket to the West and a ‘safe deposit box’ (Fernandez, Hoffman, & Aalbers, 
forthcoming). In 2013 5.2% of all new-built homes in central London were sold to Russians 
(Knight Frank, 2013, p. 4), and in 2014 Russians owned 20% of ‘super prime’ properties in 
London – those with asking prices of £10 million or more (Barrett, 2014). Even though 
already impressive, these numbers may actually understate the true total, as they do not 
capture offshore structures fronted by nominees, of which Russians are particularly fond 
(The Economist, 2014b).  
 
The resulting formation of vested interests and trans-border interdependencies produces an 
unstable assemblage of regulation, business interests, built environment and financial flows 
that can both facilitate and constrain geopolitical interests. On the one hand, the case of 
Russia’s elite seeking to place their wealth outside the country, can be considered an 
indicator of a vulnerable Russia where ‘even those who have done well […] prefer to store 
at least a portion of their wealth in countries with strong legal safeguards and a history of 
political stability’ (Scott Cooper, 2015). This means that the basis for Russia’s current 
strengths and future prospects – tax revenues, investments but also an educated workforce 
– is eroded (Boltenko & Gaydarova, 2015; Reznik, Galouchko, & Arkhipov, 2015). On the 
                                                        
6
 It should be noted, however, that as per 2015, more than half of Russia’s OFDI was attributed to just three 
countries – Cyprus (37%), Netherlands (13%), and British Virgin Islands (12%) (CBR, 2016). These are 
not genuine investments but attempts to take capital ‘off-shore’ to protect it from the Russian state or to 
evade domestic taxation.  
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other hand, the large-scale capital flight from Russia and its ‘materialization’ in overseas 
property also equips the Russian state with certain leverage. This is exemplified by a 
confidential report that was famously photographed when delivered to UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron in the wake of the Crimea crisis, which suggested that Britain should ‘not 
support, for now, trade sanctions’ or ‘close London’s financial center to Russians’(Judah, 
2014, p. A19).  It has been mentioned more than once that London’s thorough permeation 
with Russian wealth contributes to Britain’s reluctance to take a policy stance towards 
Russia as strong as some of its political fractions demanded (The Economist, 2014b).  
 
Yet, the geopolitical significance of property investment abroad is not limited to the super 
rich. Whilst Russia’s wealth elite invests in real estate in London, New York and other 
world cities, the country’s middle class buys secondary properties as holiday homes in 
Russia’s neighboring countries and Southern Europe (Lipkina, 2013). This also has 
implications for geopolitical relations. Montenegro, a popular holiday destination for 
Russians, is a case in point. The country of only 260,000 inhabitants produces around one 
quarter of its GDP through tourism (WTTC, 2015). Russians not only make up the largest 
share of it, but are also the biggest foreign investors (SEEbiz, 2014). According to the 
Central Bank of Montenegro, the biggest share of Russia’s annual investments in 2013 
went to the real estate sector (EUR 108.3 million), with intercompany debt (EUR 25.1 
million) and investments in companies and banks (EUR 3.0 million) lagging far behind 
(Intellinews, 2014). Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta and the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), who gained access to Montenegro’s state 
cadastral record, reported that as much as 40% of Montenegrin real estate is Russian-owned 
(Anin, Suchotin, Kobylkina, & Burskaya, 2011; OCCRP, 2011). In addition to middle class 
owners, Russian oligarchs have purchased large land plots for commercial purposes (Anin, 
Suchotin, Kobylkina, & Burskaya, 2011). 
 
Russia’s presence in Montenegro’s real estate market not only creates economic 
dependencies but also a rather vocal political constituency. This became visible in the 
context of Montenegro’s accession to NATO and its eventual support of the EU sanction 
regime against Russia – to which pro-Russian groups responded by organising protests and 
calling for the resignation of Montenegro’s Prime Minister (Gramer, 2015; Radio Free 
Europe, 2015). Yet, at the same time as the current geopolitical tensions have highlighted 
the leverage Russia has in Montenegro, they may also contribute to the eclipse of this very 
influence. The devaluation of the ruble – the effect of sanctions and low global oil prices, 
as well as anger amongst Russians about Montenegro’s geopolitical alliance have led to a 
decline in tourism with many Russians trying to sell their properties and leave that country 
(Rujevic, 2015). It remains to be seen to what extent this will have an impact on the 
country’s economy, but it has already created difficulties for the Montenegrin government 
in finding a political balance between EU and Russia. Properties in Greece in contrast have 
experienced a constant inflow of Russian capital, with the number of luxury villas bought 
by Russians doubling in 2015. This can be partially explained with the dramatic decline of 
real estate prices – by approximately 50% for luxury properties since 2009 (Barzilay, 
2015). What is more, however, in contrast to Montenegro, Greece’s Syriza government 
condemned the sanctions against Russia and has done much to strengthen Greek-Russian 
relations. Greek real estate therefore not only offers investment opportunities, but the close 
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relations between the two countries simultaneously present some sort of protection from 
possible asset seizures as part of the EU sanction regime (Khan, 2015). At the same time, 
the increasing share of Russian property interests in Greece will likely create a new level 
of interdependencies between the two countries.  
 
The geopolitical relevance and sensitivity of foreign property ownership also affects 
everyday life discourses. For instance, a Financial Times article (Hope, 2014) about the 
growing presence of Russians in Bulgaria – an estimated 400,000 Russians own properties 
in the country – invoked heated debates amongst its readers online. Some readers 
complained that Bulgaria is turning into a backdoor to the EU through which Russians can 
influence European political agendas. Such discourses echo posters such as ‘Yesterday 
Russian tanks, today Russia banks’ used in Prague during the commemoration of the 45th 
anniversary of the Prague Spring in 2013, soon after the Russian state-owned Sberbank 
acquired Austria’s Volksbank International (VBI), which operates across Eastern Europe 
(Sputnik, 2012). While admittedly anecdotally, this ‘everyday geopolitics’ nonetheless 
highlights an acute awareness of the complex interdependencies and (geo)political 
sensitivities produced by foreign real estate ownership. 
 
The internationalization of real estate also creates new vulnerabilities that competing states 
can exploit. The sanctions the EU and US imposed on Russia in 2014, for example, 
restricted transactions with a number of major Russian companies, some of which owned 
properties abroad. The heavy presence of Russian capital in Ukraine has also increased 
Russia’s vulnerability. For example, radicals have regularly attacked street offices of 
Russian retail banks in Ukraine (AP, 2016). This has led major Russian banks to seek 
strategies to sell off their branches in Ukraine (Dement’yeva & Lokshina, 2016).  
   
 
The geopolitics of state-led projects  
 
In the previous sections, we outlined some cases of dependencies that characterise trans-
border real estate links and their implications in international relations. However, 
discursive geopolitics can also be generated by symbolic, rather than commercial real estate 
projects. The construction of a large state-funded project on foreign land (the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Paris) and the state-led mega-project achieved domestically (the Sochi 
Winter Olympics) are two examples, which we want to finally discuss here.  
 
Since the 2000s, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has expanded its structures globally 
and undergone a process of conscious internationalization. Building on its already dense 
network of properties, ROC acquired new land and built churches across the globe (Blitt 
2011 p. 415). Although ROC is formally separated from the Russian state, it has 
traditionally played part in assembling the ‘Russian world’ (russkiy mir). Thus, even in the 
absence of the formal state institutions, churches and parishes in Russia’s near and far 
abroad provide the material infrastructure for the Russian state to additionally exert its 
geographic reach if not influence  (Suslov, 2014, p. 46).  
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The geopolitics of ROC’s international expansion is well illustrated by the project of the 
state-financed Russian Orthodox Spiritual and Cultural Centre in Paris (Centre Spirituel et 
Culturel Orthodoxe Russe).  The plan to build a large orthodox centre by the Seine dates 
back to 2007 and was supported by Russia’s highest authorities (Gauthier-Villars, 2013). 
The cathedral, called Sainte-Trinité, which is part of the Russian centre, will have  
diplomatic immunity and has become a key stage on which the complex relations between 
Russia and France and their respective position vis-à-vis the EU and US are played out. 
President Hollande has been repeatedly criticised by the US for supporting the project 
despite the EU sanction regime (Gauthier-Villars 2013). What is more, the project is not 
only a proxy in EU-Russian relations, but also served as lever in the international 
negotiation of Russian domestic power struggles. In 2014, an international arbitration court 
in The Hague ruled that Russia should pay Yukos shareholders $50 billion as compensation 
for bankrupting the oil company. Lawyers of Hulley Enterprises Limited, a Cyprus 
registered company, representing former Yukos shareholders, consequently requested the 
seizure of the Church in Paris, albeit unsuccessfully (BBC, 2015; Tass, 2016).   
 
The multiple levels of contestation surrounding Sainte-Trinité highlight the assembled 
nature of authority and the resulting difficulty to differentiate between outward oriented 
functions of power projection and introspective objectives of identity building. On the one 
hand, the cathedral is an outpost of the Russian state, providing a material and discursive 
space for the Russian presence in France. On the other hand the church may be seen as an 
attempt to ‘gain hold over Russian émigré communities’ (Herpen, 2015, p. 251). This 
supports the narrative of the ‘Russian World’, which includes all members of the Russian 
civilization, even beyond the country’s current territorial borders. Putin, for example, has 
spoken about the ‘multimillion Russian world which is, of course, much larger than Russia’ 
(Putin, 2007). This narrative is part of Russia’s attempt to bolster its authority through a 
shared national, or indeed civilizational, consciousness; in Benedict Anderson’s 
terminology, to create an imagined community (2006), which does not unfold along 
territorial borders but cuts across them and draws new borderings in the process (Moisio 
& Paasi, 2013).  
 
However, it is not only the trans-border presence of foreign actors that can render the 
domain of real estate geopolitically relevant; the geopolitics of real estate can take place 
even in the absence of extra-territorial presence. Like strategic military weapons, which do 
not necessarily need to cross borders to make a hard power statement in international 
relations, specific real estate projects can send certain messages internationally (even if of 
course of a more subtle, soft power nature). Such external geo-political effects of real estate 
can be enabled by symbolically significant domestic projects. Historically, these effects 
were performed by powerful monuments and buildings with a particular ‘statement’ – be 
those the Egyptian pyramids or Dubai skyscrapers. For example, ever since Soviet times, 
Russians have played a game of building the tallest skyscrapers in Europe (i.e. the main 
building of Moscow State University in 1953-1990 and a range of skyscrapers at the 
Moscow International Business Centre more recently). Soviet national and regional capital 
cities also sought to play the role of ‘model socialist cities’ to showcase, through their 
planning and built environment a superior socialist, pro-workers way of life. In these 
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examples, inherently domestic projects involve extra-domestic, and arguably geopolitical, 
dimensions – such as bidding for extra-territorial recognition, respect, and influence.  
 
The neoliberal competitive state has only heightened the soft geopolitics of real estate. 
Here, we can draw again on Brenner’s (2004) account of the rescaling of state spaces under 
neoliberalism, which he describes as the attempt of the nation-state to rearticulate its 
economic power via privileging certain territories as ‘strategic’ and promoting them 
internationally on behalf of the whole state. This conceptualization of state space 
restructuring can be extended to account for same instances of the geopolitics of real estate. 
First, the ‘glocalization’ of states’ territorial priorities can be embodied in real estate 
projects, which may, secondly, underpin not only the geo-economic competitiveness of the 
state, as Brenner suggests, but also its soft power and geopolitical standing.  
 
Among such glocalized real estate projects with extra-territorial reach are mega-projects, 
such as the Olympic Games. Indeed, mega-events have long been recognized as some of 
the key strategies that shape contemporary territorial governance (Essex & Chalkey, 2004; 
Gold & Gold, 2010; Hiller, 2006). They are powerful marketing tools, which provide 
opportunities to boost the image of not only specific cities, but also a whole country. The 
Olympic Games specifically are widely acknowledged for their soft power implications, 
which also explains why countries are so keen to host them despite records of chronic 
financial problems the Games create for public budgets. The 2008 Beijing Olympics, for 
example, provided the opportunity to demonstrate China’s rapid economic growth and 
increasing global dominance (Dimopoulou, 2009; Sun & Ye, 2010).  Many commentators 
have argued that much like the Beijing Olympics, the Sochi Winter Games, which took 
place in 2014, also were an attempt to project an image of a re-emerging Russia (e.g. 
Persson & Petersson, 2014; for a more differentiated discussion see: Golubchikov & 
Slepukhina, 2014). Indeed, after the loss of its superpower status during the Soviet era in 
the ‘humiliating’ decade of the 1990s, Putin’s Russia has sought to regain its place among 
the world's most powerful nations. Russia’s renewed national consciousness has meant the 
abandonment of the non-ideological, interest based foreign policy of the 1990s (Morozova, 
2009, p. 668), and a ‘a noisy and confrontational return to the international scene’ as of the 
early 2000s (Krastev, 2008, p. 49). The Sochi Winter Olympics represented the soft power 
dimension of Russia’s resurgent international ambitions. 
 
It is significant that the international impact of the Olympics is importantly leveraged via 
particular real estate projects, including sport stadia, but also urban regeneration and 
infrastructure. In the case of Sochi, these were overwhelmingly state-sponsored. The Sochi 
Winter Olympics made the world news as the most expensive event in history, with the 
total costs of investment in the city’s preparation for the Games of around $50 billion. The 
project was designated as one of Russia’s national priorities, turning Sochi into ‘one of the 
largest construction sites in the world’ (Fox Sports, 2012). The main sponsors of the 
Olympics were large, often government-controlled corporations such as Gazprom, and 
Rosneft, and companies that received loans from state-owned banks, mainly VEB and 
Sberbank. 
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It is conceptually important that investing large amount of state resources in localized 
projects with a global reach like Sochi also involves states’ spatial priorities, where 
particular locations are represented as internationally (and geopolitically) significant 
(Golubchikov, 2010). Sochi has been identified as one of such places. While the 2014 
Winter Olympic event was the cornerstone of this strategy, 80% of the costs Sochi’s 
redevelopment accrued were unrelated to sport (Golubchikov, 2016). This means that even 
‘more mundane’ urban regeneration, real estate creation (including hotels and housing), 
and urban infrastructure became part of the complex geopolitical assemblages centred on 
the event of the Olympics.  
 
Taken together, the examples of Paris and Sochi further demonstrate that the urban, the 
national, and the geopolitical are not necessarily autonomous from each other as the 
domains of different spatial scales and territories, but rather interpenetrate each other 
through the assemblages of meanings, practices, and processes involved in the production 
of politically and geopolitically significant real estate. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In 2014 Foreign Affairs announced that old-fashioned geopolitics is back, and with it 
Russia as a central player (Mead, 2014). It is true that we are witnessing a new wave of 
struggles over territory. Yet, this ‘old-fashioned’ or ‘hard’ geopolitics is intermingled with 
new forms of ‘soft’ geopolitical power offered by economic globalization. The 
internationalization of real estate interests represents this. Nation states (as institutionalized 
authority) create regulatory conditions that allow real estate business to take place across 
national borders; while doing so, nation states open room, intentionally or unintentionally, 
for the interplay of geopolitical interests – effectively inserting real estate more eloquently 
as a component into the fluid geopolitical assemblages. 
Russia is just one example of a state that experiences the geopolitical implications of the 
internationalization of real estate – in terms of both promoting its own soft power and 
exposing itself to other states’ influences. We reviewed several entanglements of real estate 
internationalization and its specific geopolitical constitutions and implications. Firstly, the 
case of Russia’s housing finance system showed how the export of institutionalized norms 
and legislation presents lasting influence over foreign territory. Secondly, the cross-border 
capital flows through real estate have circuitous yet potent effects on making international 
relations: property built or purchased abroad becomes a conduit of geopolitical influences 
and dependencies. Thirdly, real estate can also be a venue for performing state soft power 
more directly – if embodied in edifices that are designed to project a certain image of the 
state beyond national boundaries or that are ‘read’ as such by international communities.  
This is of course not to overstate the power of real estate in influencing foreign policy and 
international relations; real estate is simply one of many spheres that assemble international 
politics and geopolitics and deserves to be studied as such. Yet, real estate importantly runs 
like a red thread through diverse aspects of our contemporary reality, often connecting 
them in unexpected ways. This pervasiveness is already well reflected in the multiple 
streams of research that varyingly highlight the role of real estate for global finance, 
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everyday life, and as a dominant sector of the economy. However, the geopolitical 
consequences of real estate globalization remain less researched. The ontological and 
epistemological imaginaries in the related bodies of literatures have so far precluded 
investigations of the role of real estate in the production of geopolitics.  
 
With this paper, we invite further research on the geopolitical implications emanating from 
real estate. In this way the scope of the literature on real estate internationalization can be 
extended, for example, to problematize the role of real estate in geopolitics and the 
understanding of real estate circulations as geopolitical circulations. Similarly, studies in 
international relations, geopolitics, political geography, and the likes can also be enriched 
through a better appreciation of the political externalities (and exteriorities) of real estate, 
as well as more inclusive conceptualisations of the constitution of state power and soft 
power. Indeed, we consider the geopolitics of real estate not simply as a politico-economic 
or regulatory context important for the operation of real estate markets, but rather as a case 
of the geopolitics of the multiple: that is, multi-actor and distributed material and discursive 
assemblages that represent the contingent and emergent formation of connections and 
considerations, which affect the ways how formal and informal inter-state relations are 
being negotiated and how formal and informal political geographies are being made and 
remade. 
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